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DRAFT

The Exception That Swallowed the Rule: Fixing the Multiple-Victim Exception to
Minnesota Statute Section 609.035
By Benjamin J. Butler1
I.

INTRODUCTION.
Consider the following situation: Dick and Jane are in a domestic relationship.

During a heated argument, Dick strikes Jane several times, hits her with a broken beer
bottle, and threatens to kill her if she calls the police. Jane calls the police anyway and
Dick is arrested. The county attorney could charge Dick with several crimes: seconddegree assault with a dangerous weapon (the beer bottle)2; terroristic threats (based upon
the verbal threat)3; and/or domestic assault4. One prosecutor might focus the charges on
the most serious crime. Another might want to “throw the book at him” and file every
charge supported by the evidence. But no matter how many crimes the prosecutor
charges, the defendant will probably only be sentenced on the most serious crime for
which he is convicted.
This is the result of Minnesota statutes section 609.035. Since its introduction as
part of the Criminal Code of 1963, section 609.035 has provided that a district court may
impose only a single sentence for multiple crimes committed by a criminal defendant
during the a single behavior incident. The theory behind the statute is simple:

1

Assistant State Public Defender, Office of the Minnesota Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota. The
author thanks professors Ted Sampsell-Jones and Peter Knapp of the William Mitchell College of Law for their
support, encouragement, and invaluable suggestions regarding this article. The author also thanks the staff of the
William Mitchell Law Review, in particular executive editor Frances Kern for her patience and Robert Hamilton for
his research assistance. The author thanks his family for pretty much everything.
2
See Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 2 (2010).
3
See Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2010).
4
See Minn. Stat. § 609.2242 (2010).
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punishment for the most serious crime committed during a single behavioral incident
incorporates punishment for all the less-serious crimes committed during the same
behavioral incident. Application of the statute not only keeps sentences rational and
proportional to a defendant’s conduct, but also reduces the incentive for prosecutors to
over-charge cases. This is true because in most cases adding duplicative charges will not
change the defendant’s total sentence.
What if, however, during Dick and Jane’s argument, their neighbor Sally came
over to see what was wrong? After Dick hit Jane with the bottle, he turned to Sally and
punched her in the face, knocking out one of her teeth. In addition to the charges
involving Jane, a prosecutor could charge Dick with third-degree assault for his actions
against Sally5 But under the plain language and rationale of section 609.035, the court
could not sentence Dick for assaulting Sally because that crime was committed during the
same behavioral incident as a more serious crime: the second-degree assault of Jane.
Almost forty years ago, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the second
scenario described above required a different result than the one mandated by the plain
language of section 609.035. Thus was born the “multiple victim exception” to section
609.035. Where a defendant commits crimes during a single behavioral incident against
multiple victims, a court may impose multiple sentences of up to one sentence per victim.
Although the statute contained no such exception, the Court held that the Legislature did
not intend to prevent the imposition of multiple sentences in such cases.
5

See Minn. Stat. § 609.223, subd. 1 (2010). The loss of a tooth is ordinarily, but not always, evidence of
“substantial bodily harm,” required for conviction under section 609.223, subd. 1. State v. Moore, 699 N.W.2d 733,
736-37 (Minn. 2005); State v. Bridgeforth, 357 N.W.2d 393, 394 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
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The Court later added a caveat to the multiple-victim exception: the total sentence
imposed under the exception must not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the
defendant’s conduct.6 The purpose of this caveat was to maintain in multiple-victim
cases some consideration into the proportionality of the sentence to the defendant’s
conduct.7
The multiple-victim exception as it currently exists is problematic in several
respects. By allowing a court to impose without limit one sentence per behavioral
incident per victim, the exception encourages the kind of over-charging and charge
bargaining that section 609.035 was designed to prevent. This is especially true in cases
involving a multitude of victims. More fundamentally, the exception is problematic
because it was created by the Court, rather than the Legislature, and results from a rather
dubious piece of statutory interpretation. Because the exception is not moored to the
language of a statute, it remains subject to change on a case-by-case basis. Recently, the
Court expanded the exception to, for the first time, affirm the imposition of more than
one sentence per victim, and, in the same case, dramatically altered how a district court is
to determine for which offense to impose a sentence.8 In addition, the “fail safe”
provision of the exception – that the total sentence imposed not unfairly exaggerate the
criminality of the defendant’s conduct – is not much of a fail-safe at all. It is amorphous,
difficult to apply, and leads to inconsistent results.

6

See, e.g., State v. Rieck, 286 N.W.2d 724, 727 (Minn. 1979).
See State v. Edwards, 774 N.W.2d 596, 606 n.6 (Minn. 2009) (using “unfairly exaggerate” standard to refute
suggestion that multiple-victim exception “did not incorporate notions of proportionality”) (citations omitted).
8
State v. Ferguson, 808 N.W.2d 586, 589-92 (Minn. 2012). The author of this article represented Michael Ferguson
in the appeals of his convictions and sentences.
7
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This article proposes that the Legislature should amend section 609.035 to address
the problems with the court-created version of the multiple-victim exception. First, the
Legislature should amend the statute to allow for the imposition of multiple sentences in
cases involving crimes committed against multiple victims. Second, in keeping with
Minnesota’s goal of maintaining a rational, proportional sentencing system, the
Legislature should limit the district court to imposing no more than two sentences per
behavioral incident. Third, the Legislature should codify Minnesota Supreme Court
caselaw holding that the court can only impose a sentence for the most serious offense
committed per victim, using comparison of the statutory maximum sentences and the
offense’s severity-level rankings under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines to
determine which of several offenses is most serious. These charges will ensure that
Minnesota’s sentencing system is applied consistently and even-handedly and that
criminal defendants receive sentences commensurate with their culpability.
II.

SECTION 609.035 AND THE MULTIPLE-VICTIM EXCEPTION.
Minnesota statute section 609.035 provides, in pertinent part, that “if a person’s

conduct constitutes more than one offense under the laws of this state, the person may be
punished for only one of the offenses.”9 The statute prohibits the imposition of multiple
sentences for multiple crimes committed during a single behavioral incident.10 The

9

Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1 (2010).
See State v. Scott, 298 N.W.2d 67, 68 (Minn. 1980). The statutory phrase “a person’s conduct” refers to a “single
behavioral incident.” State v. Johnson, 141 N.W.2d 517, 523 (Minn. 1966). Intentional crimes are committed
during a single behavioral incident when they share a unity of time, place, and criminal objective. State v.
Bookwalter, 541 N.W.2d 290, 293-96 (Minn. 1995).
10
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purpose of section 609.035 is to limit punishment for multiple crimes “to the maximum
permitted for the most serious crime committed.”11
In an early case interpreting the statute, the Minnesota Supreme Court explained
its purpose: “to insure that punishment for a single incident of criminal behavior
involving a multiplicity of violations will be commensurate with the criminality of
defendant’s misconduct.”12 The drafters felt that the best way to ensure that punishment
was commensurate with conduct was to limit punishment to just one crime per behavioral
incident.13 This was true, the drafters believed, because “as a practical matter a single
sentence will necessarily take into account all violations, and imposing up to the
maximum punishment for the most serious offense will include punishment for all
offenses.”14 The drafters were concerned that “permitting a series of prosecutions and
sentences where a single behavioral incident constitutes more than one offense will
‘exaggerate the criminality of the behavior involved and, in a sense, defeat the policy
underlying the constitutional protection against double jeopardy.’”15 This legislative
history shows that the single-sentence rule is not some accident of history or unintended
consequence of another policy. Instead, the prohibition against multiple sentences was a
well-thought-out and rational policy decision by the Legislature.

11

Johnson, 141 N.W.2d 520-21 (discussing Minn. Stat. § 609.035, cmt. By Maynard E. Pirsig).
Id. at 521-22.
13
Id. at 522
14
Id.
15
Id. (quoting Advisory Committee Comment, 40 M.S.A. pp. 58). In addition to prohibiting multiple sentences,
section 609.035 prohibits serialized prosecutions by requiring that all crimes arising from a single behavioral
incident are charged in a single complaint and provides broader double-jeopardy protections than those afforded by
federal law. Johnson, 141 N.W.2d at 522; Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1 (2010).
12
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Under section 609.035, a court may impose a sentence for only the most serious
offense committed during a single behavioral incident. In order to determine which of
several offenses is most serious, courts should compare the actual sentences which would
be imposed for different offenses, the severity-level rankings for those offenses under the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, and the statutory maximum sentences.16 If those
factors are identical, or if the crimes at issue are non-felonies, the court may consider “the
nature of the offenses to determine which offense is most serious.”17 Using this method,
a court imposing a single sentence can be sure that it is punishing the defendant for the
worst of his or her conduct and, therefore, punishing the defendant for all of his or her
criminal conduct.18
The number of sentences imposed has significant practical consequences both for
the total sentence imposed in a particular case and for subsequent cases. In many cases,
multiple sentences can often be consecutive to one another.19 An offender who has to
serve two sentences consecutive to one another will almost always be in prison longer
than an offender who does not. But even if the multiple sentences are to be served
16

State v. Kebaso, 713 N.W.2d 317, 322-23 (Minn. 2007). Curiously, it was not until 2007 that the Minnesota
Supreme Court explicitly detailed how a court should determine which of several crimes committed during a
behavioral incident was the more serious. Id. at 322.
17
Id. at 323. For example, the defendant in Kebaso was convicted of gross-misdemeanor domestic assault and
gross-misdemeanor interference with a 911 call. Id. at 320. The offenses occurred during a single behavioral
incident. Id. The crimes had the same statutory maximum sentences and, because they were not felonies, were not
ranked in the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 323. Considering the nature of the offenses, the Supreme Court held
that domestic-assault was more serious than interference with a 911 call because domestic assault is a crime against
a person rather than against the administration of justice. Id. The Court also considered the fact that, under the facts
of the case, domestic assault was the primary crime and the interference crime was incidental to the domestic
assault. Id. Finally, the Court held that the lower courts could not consider the possible immigration consequences
of the two crimes when deciding which is more serious. Id. at 323.
18
See Minn. Stat. § 609.035 (1963 Advisory Committee Comment).
19
Consecutive sentences are sentences to be served one after the other. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 1.B.3 (2012).
Depending on the types of offenses involved and the circumstances thereof, consecutive sentencing is either
presumptive (that is, required unless the court departs), permissive (may be imposed, or not imposed, without a
departure), or would require a departure from the presumptive sentence. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F (2012).
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concurrent with one another, the imposition of multiple sentences can affect the total
sentence.20 Under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant’s presumptive
sentence is determined by comparing on a grid the defendant’s criminal-history score
with the severity level of the to-be-sentenced offense.21 The criminal-history score is
made up of one point or half-point for each felony offense which has been sentenced at
the time of the sentencing on the instant offense.22 In many situations, a court can use
one of a defendant’s convictions and sentences from a single behavioral incident to
increase his or her criminal-history score for a second conviction and sentence arising
from the same incident.23 This sentencing practice is known as the Hernandez method
and leads to increased sentences because the increased criminal-history score leads to an
increased presumptive sentence.24 When the criminal-history score is increased, the endresult presumptive sentence is likewise increased.

20

Section 609.035 in most cases precludes the imposition of multiple concurrent sentences for crimes committed
during a single behavioral incident. State v. Bookwalter, 541 N.W.2d 290, 293 (Minn. 1995).
21
See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2 (2012); see also Taylor v. State, 670 N.W.2d 584, 586-87 (Minn. 2003) (describing
Minnesota’s determinate-sentencing system and sentencing-guidelines grid). Minnesota’s sentencing-guidelines
system was “the dominant model for the creation of guidelines in other states and for the federal system as well.”
Brian Forst, Managing Miscarriages of Justice from Victimization to Reintegration, 74 Alb. L. Rev. 1209, 1263
(2010-11). The purpose of the Guidelines is “is to establish rational and consistent sentencing standards which ...
are proportional to the severity of the offense of conviction and the extent of the offender's criminal history.” Minn.
Sent. Guidelines § 1 (2012).
22
Minn. Sent. Guidelines § 2.B (2012).
23
See, e.g., State v. Gartland, 330 N.W.2d 881, 883 (Minn. 1983). The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines prohibit
the use of the Hernandez method when imposing multiple sentences for certain drug crimes, burglary and crimes
committed during a burglary, and kidnapping and crimes committed during a kidnapping. See Minn. Sent.
Guidelines § 2.b.e.1 (2012); Williams, 771 N.W.2d at 522-23.
24
Minn. Sent. Guidelines § 1.B.9; 2.b.1.e (2012). Under the Hernandez method of sentencing, “when a defendant is
sentenced for multiple offenses on the same day, a conviction for which the defendant is first sentenced is added to
his or her criminal-history score for another offense for which he or she is also sentenced.” State v. Williams, 771
N.W.2d 514, 521 (Minn. 2007) (citation omitted). The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the legitimacy of this
sentencing method in State v. Hernandez, 311 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Minn. 1981). Court opinions often use the terms
“Hernandize” or “Hernandez method” to describe this form of sentencing. See Williams, 771 N.W.2d at 521 -22
(citing State v. Soto, 562 N.W.2d 299, 302-03 (Minn. 1997)). The Sentencing Guidelines do the same. Minn. Sent.
Guidelines §1.B.9 (2012).

7

DRAFT

As an example of the practical effect of the multiple-victim exception, consider
State v. Patterson.25 Patterson was convicted of aiding and advising the drive-by
shooting of T.D. and aiding and advising the second-degree murder of R.A.26 The crimes
occurred during a single behavioral incident.27 The multiple-victim exception allowed
the district court to sentence him for both crimes.28 Using Patterson’s criminal-history
score of zero, the presumptive sentences for the offenses were 48 months in prison and
306 months in prison, respectively.29 The district court, however, used the Hernandez
method to increase Patterson’s criminal-history score from zero to one before sentencing
Patterson for the murder of R.A.30 This, in turn, increased Patterson’s sentence from 306
months to 326 months in prison.31 Applying both the multiple-victim exception and the
Hernandez sentencing method not only caused Patterson to receive two sentences for
crimes committed during a single behavioral incident but it increased the length of his
total sentence by 20 months.
Even if the imposition of multiple sentences would not increase the total sentence
for a defendant in the case at bar, multiple sentences will adversely affect the defendant’s
criminal-history score in subsequent cases. For example, the imposition of concurrent
sentences for two misdemeanor assaults might not affect the defendant’s total sentence in

25

State v. Patterson, 796 N.W.2d 516 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011), aff’d 812 N.W.2d 106 (Minn. 2012). The Minnesota
Court of Appeals held that Patterson was properly sentenced. Patterson, 796 N.W.2d at 532. The Minnesota
Supreme Court granted review of the case only to address one of Patterson’s challenges to his conviction, and it
affirmed the court of appeals on that point. Patterson II, 812 N.W.2d at 108.
26
Patterson, 796 N.W.2d at 522.
27
Id. at 532
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
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that case, because non-felony sentences cannot be Hernandized and probationary and jail
time is capped by statute.32 But in any subsequent cases, the sentences will result in the
defendant receiving two misdemeanor units instead of one, which will get him or her that
much closer to the four such units required to add a point to the criminal-history score.33
Section 609.035 also helps achieve consistent and rational results in charging
practices. A person’s criminal behavior during a single behavioral incident might support
one or multiple criminal charges. Only the prosecutor can decide which and how many
charges to level in a particular case.34 If a defendant could be sentenced for every crime
he or she committed during a single behavioral incident then the prosecutor could
determine the final sentence by deciding how many crimes to charge because a
defendant’s total sentence could increase with each conviction. In order to achieve the
longest possible sentence, a prosecutor might be tempted to file duplicative charges,
convictions for which would add nothing of value to a defendant’s culpability but could
dramatically increase the presumptive sentence. A different prosecutor, on the other
hand, might charge the defendant with only the most serious crime committed during the
behavioral incident under the theory that punishing the defendant for that crime will
encompass punishment for all other, less-serious crimes committed during the same
behavioral incident. Because section 609.035 normally allows only one sentence per
behavioral incident, prosecutors have little incentive to over-charge defendants because

32

Minn. Stat. §§ 609.02, subds. 3-4 (2010) (defining misdemeanor as a crime punishable by no more than 90 days in
jail and gross-misdemeanor as a crime punishable by no more than 365 days in jail); § 609.135, subd. 2 (2010)
(providing for maximum probationary terms for misdemeanor and gross-misdemeanor offenses).
33
Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.3 (2012).
34
See State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252, 254 (Minn. 1996).
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multiple, duplicative charges cannot lead to longer sentences.35 Of course, section
609.035 does not limit or interfere with a prosecutor’s charging options; a prosecutor may
charge however many offenses probable-cause supports. But under section 609.035, the
practical effect of such charging decisions is limited to punishing the defendant for only
the most serious offense, under the entirely rational theory that such punishment will
fully account for his or her criminal behavior.36
III.

THE MULTIPLE-VICTIM EXCEPTION.

A. The Judicial Creation of the Multiple-Victim Exception.
The plain language of section 609.035 created a bright-line rule: one sentence per
behavioral incident. However, from the day it enacted the statute, the Legislature carved
out exceptions to this rule. When it was enacted in 1963, section 609.035 contained only
a burglary exception to its prohibition on multiple sentences for crimes committed during
a single behavioral incident.i That is, the statute permitted punishment for a crime
committed during the course of a burglary in addition to the burglary sentence itself.ii
The legislature has amended section 609.035 throughout the past fifty years to provide
several additional exceptions permitting multiple convictions arising out of a single
behavioral incident.iii These include exceptions for crimes involving ineligible people
possessing firearms,iv crimes committed while fleeing a peace officer,v criminal sexual
conduct crimes committed with force or violence,vi and arson.vii The legislature also
35

Of course, if a defendant commits multiple offenses during different behavioral incidents, a prosecutor may
properly charge and convict a defendant for each of them, and use each conviction to obtain a longer total sentence.
See, e.g., State v. Soto, 562 N.W.2d 299, 304-05 (Minn. 1997) (affirming multiple Hernandized sentences for
defendant who committed several drug-sale offenses on different days and during different behavioral incidents).
Such a result violates neither section 609.035 nor the policies behind the statute because the crimes at issue were
committed during different behavioral incidents rather than during a single course of conduct.
36
See Minn. Stat. §609.035 (1963 Advisory Committee Comment).
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created charging-statute exceptions to section 609.035, permitting a court to impose
sentences for offenses arising out of a single behavioral incident.viii These include
exceptions for kidnapping,ix certain crimes against unborn children,x crimes while
wearing or possessing a bullet-resistant vest,xi crimes involving the solicitation of
juveniles,xii crimes involving the use of police radios,xiii and certain driving while
intoxicated offenses.xiv
These exceptions reveal that the Legislature is well aware of how to make policy
decisions that, in certain situations, multiple sentences for multiple crimes committed
during a single behavioral incident are warranted. The Legislature has never made such a
decision regarding crimes against multiple victims committed during a single behavioral
incident. Instead, the Minnesota Supreme Court “created” that exception to the plain
language of section 609.035.37 The decision leading to that creation presents a classic
case of bad facts making at least questionable law.38
Philip Stangvik suffered from mental-health problems and delusions. Among
other things, he thought his wife was trying to kill him by poisoning his food.39 Stangvik
had a history of committing violent acts against his wife and children and, as a result, had
been committed to and discharged from several mental institutions.40 In 1963, Stangvik
was a patient at the Fergus Falls State Hospital.41 In May of that year, he was granted a

37

The Minnesota Supreme Court has repeatedly referred to the multiple-victim exception as being “court created.”
See State v. Gartland, 330 N.W.2d 881, 883 (Minn. 1983); State v. McAdoo, 330 N.W.2d 104, 107 (Minn. 1983);
State v. Wallace, 327 N.W.2d 85, 87 (Minn. 1982).
38
State ex rel. Stangvik, 161 N.W.2d 667 (Minn. 1968).
39
Stangvik, 161 N.W.2d at 669.
40
Id.
41
Id.
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series of three-day provisional discharges so he could visit his parents.42 During one such
discharge, Stangvik stabbed to death his wife and two children.43
As part of a plea agreement, Stangvik pleaded guilty to first-degree murder for
killing his wife and to two counts of second-degree murder, one relating to the death of
each of his children.44 The district court imposed three sentences: life in prison for the
first-degree count and concurrent sentences of 40 years in prison for each of the seconddegree counts.45
On appeal, Stangvik argued, among other things, that the imposition of multiple
sentences violated the then newly enacted section 609.035.46 His argument would seem
to have merit, given that the district court imposed three sentences for crimes clearly
committed during a single behavioral incident, a fact the Minnesota Supreme Court
acknowledged.47 Nonetheless, the Court affirmed the imposition of multiple sentences.48
The Court based its holding on two grounds. Primarily, the Court concluded that,
when it enacted section 609.035, “the legislature did not intend in every case to immunize
offenders from the consequences of separate crimes intentionally committed in a single
episode against more than one individual.”49 The Court did not cite any legislative

42

Id.
Id.
44
Id. at 670.
45
Id.
46
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that section 609.035 applied to Stangvik’s case even though it had not been
enacted at the time of his offense. Stangvik, 161 N.W.2d at 671-72.
47
Id. at 673. Notwithstanding this acknowledgement, the Court went on to hold that “from a legal point of view [the
murders] were totally unrelated.” Id. The Court did not explain how the three offenses committed during a single
behavioral incident – until that time, the only “legal point of view” that mattered – were “totally unrelated.”
48
Id.
49
Id. at 672. The Court cited six decisions in support of this proposition, but none of those cases involved the
imposition on multiple sentences for crimes committed during a single behavioral incident. Id. (citing City of
Bloomington v. Kossow, 269 Minn. 467, 131 N.W.2d 206; State v. Johnson, 273 Minn. 394, 405, 141 N.W.2d 517,
43
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history to support its conclusion, but rather relied upon a series of cases in which the
California Supreme Court interpreted that state’s single-sentence statute in a similar
way.50 Essentially, the Court held that the policy behind the single-sentence rule of
section 609.035, that a sentence for the most serious crime will encompass sentencing for
all other crimes committed during the behavioral incident, did not hold true in cases
involving multiple victims.51
The Court also noted a second rationale for its decision: that the imposition of
multiple sentences in Stangvik’s case “does not offend our sense of justice.”52 The Court
held that when considering the propriety of multiple sentences under section 609.035,
“much…depend[s] on the harm inflicted and whether multiple sentences would result in
punishment grossly out of proportion to the gravity of the offense.”53 None of these
concepts appear in the text of the statute. Nonetheless, they seemed to influence the
Court’s resolution of the question, which focused on the heinousness of Stangvik’s
crimes.54 The Court also noted that the district court “was not insensitive to the severity

525; State v. Reiland, 274 Minn. 121, 124, 142 N.W.2d 635, 638; State v. Gladden, 274 Minn. 533, 144 N.W.2d
779; State v. Murphy, 277 Minn. 355, 152 N.W.2d 507; State v. Gaulke, Minn., 161 N.W.2d 662,). The Court
acknowledged that it had never considered the question presented in Stangvik. Stangvik, 161 N.W.2d at 672.
50
Stangvik, 161 N.W.2d at 672 (citing, inter alia, Neal v. State, 357 P.2d 839 (Cal. 1960)). The California statute
provided that “an act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this code may be
punishable under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more than one.” Neal, 357 P.2d at 843
(quoting Cal. Penal Code 654). In Neal, the California Supreme Court held that the California statute prohibited
sentencing a defendant more than once for violating more than one provision of the same statute. Neal, 357 P.2d at 844.
However, notwithstanding the plain language of the statute, the court also held that a defendant who commits crimes
against multiple victims may receive more than one sentence, because such a defendant is more culpable than is a person
who commits multiple offenses against a single individual. Id. at 844. In 2012, the California Supreme Court reversed the
portion of Neal which held that a court could not impose sentences for violations of different parts of the same statute.
People v. Correa, 278 P.3d 809 (Cal. 2012).
51
Stangvik, 161 N.W.2d at 672-73.
52
Stangvik, 161 N.W.2d at 673.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 672-73 (comparing case at bar to hypothetical robbery, auto-theft, and kidnapping case and noting that
defendant in hypothetical “might present a more persuasive case”).
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of punishment” and that it “permitted” the two of the charges to be amended to seconddegree murder.55
From this disturbing case was born a new doctrine: the “multiple-victim
exception” to section 609.035. Under that exception, a district court may impose not one
sentence per behavioral incident, but rather one sentence per victim per behavioral
incident.56 The one sentence imposed was to be the sentence for the most serious crime
committed against that victim during the behavioral incident.57
Subsequent to Stangvik, the Court added to the multiple-victim exception a caveat:
when a court sentences a defendant for several crimes committed against multiple victims
during a single behavioral incident, the total sentence cannot unfairly exaggerate the
criminality of the defendant’s conduct.58 The purpose of this exception to the exception
was to maintain in multiple-victim cases some consideration into the proportionality of
the sentence to the defendant’s conduct.59 Essentially, the “unfairly exaggerate” standard
allows appellate courts to reduce sentences which the court deems too long, even if the
sentence is technically permissible under the other sentencing rules.60
B. The Problems With the Multiple-Victim Exception.

55

Id.
See State v. Schmidt, 612 N.W.2d 871, 878 (Minn. 2000) (holding that court may impose “one sentence per
victim”); State v. Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d 440, 453 (Minn. 1997) (“one sentence may be imposed per victim in
multiple-victim cases”).
57
See Johnson, 141 N.W.2d at 522.
58
See State v. Marquart, 294 N.W.2d 849, 851 (Minn. 1980); State v. DeFoe, 280 N.W.2d 38, 42 (Minn. 1979).
59
See State v. Edwards, 774 N.W.2d 596, 606 n.6 (Minn. 2009) (using “unfairly exaggerate” standard to refute
suggestion that multiple-victim exception “did not incorporate notions of proportionality”) (citations omitted).
60
See, e.g., State v. Goulette, 442 N.W.2d 793, 794-95 (Minn. 1989) (holding that imposition of several consecutive
sentences, although allowable under multiple-victim exception, unfairly exaggerated the criminality of the
defendant’s conduct).
56
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There are several problems with the multiple-victim exception as it currently
stands. Application of the exception can lead to precisely the kind of charge-based
sentencing disparities that section 609.035 was enacted to prevent. More broadly, the
exception is problematic because it was created by the Minnesota Supreme Court and is
not tied to any statutory language. This judicial usurpation of legislative power is
problematic because, without a strong statutory foundation, the terms of the exception,
and how it applies to a particular situation, are always subject to change. This next
section attempts to outline these problems in more detail.
1. The Multiple-Victim Exception Allows for the Kind of ChargeBased Sentencing Disparities That Section 609.035 Was Enacted to
Avoid.
The multiple-victim exception allows for exactly the kind of charge-based
disparity in sentencing that section 609.035 was designed to prevent. Consider, for
example, the case of Michael Ferguson.61 Ferguson and his brothers Marcus and
Matthew Dillard were in a van when Marcus fired several shots towards a duplex house
in St. Paul.62 Matthew was the driver. According to the Dillard brothers’ testimony at
Michael Ferguson’s trial, Michael handed Marcus the gun Marcus used to commit the
shooting.63 As it turned out, there were eight people inside one of the apartments in the
duplex, including at least one sleeping baby.64

61

See State v. Ferguson, 2009 WL 3172139 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (Ferguson I); State v. Ferguson, 786 N.W.2d
640 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (Ferguson II), rev’d 808 N.W.2d 586 (Minn. 2012) (Ferguson III).
62
State v. Ferguson, 2009 WL 3172139, *1 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (Ferguson I).
63
Id.
64
Id. at *2.
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Each brother was initially charged with one count of drive-by shooting of an
occupied building and one count of second-degree assault.65 The Dillard brothers
accepted plea offers under which they each received a single sentence of 41 or 72 months
in prison.66
The state offered Ferguson the same deal. But Ferguson pleaded not guilty and
exercised his constitutional right to a trial. On the eve of trial, the State amended the
complaint to charge a total of nine crimes: one count of drive-by shooting and eight
counts of second-degree assault, one count for each occupant of the duplex.67 Ferguson
was convicted of and ultimately was sentenced for all nine crimes.68 His total sentence,
reached after partially Hernandizing his criminal-history score and imposing some of the
65

See Complaint, State v. Ferguson, Ramsey County File No. 62-K1-07-003463. A person commits a drive-by
shooting if he or she recklessly discharges a firearm at or towards a building; the sentence for the crime is enhanced
if the building is occupied. Minn. Stat. § 609.66, subd. 1e(b) (2006). A person commits a second-degree assault by
using a dangerous weapon to do an act intended to cause another person to fear death or immediate bodily harm.
Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2006). Under the second-degree assault statute, it matters not whether the person
targeted by the assault was actually frightened or even knew about the act, and it matters not whether the defendant
even knew that the named victim existed. See State v. Hough, 585 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1997) (where defendant
fired multiple shots at a home; affirming convictions for second-degree assault of all six occupants of the home,
including two sleeping children who did not know about the shots at the time and about whom defendant did not
know).
66
The details of the Dillard brothers’ sentences are included in Ferguson’s Feb. 28, 2008, sentencing memorandum,
submitted to the district court, at pgs. 4-5. Marcus Dillard pleaded guilty to drive-by shooting under a plea
agreement which called for him to receive a 48-month sentence if he appeared for sentencing and a 72-month
sentence if he did not. Marcus did not appear at the originally scheduled sentencing hearing, and he therefore
received a 72-month sentence. Matthew Dillard appeared for the scheduled sentencing hearing and was sentenced to
41 months in prison.
67
See Amended Complaint, Dec. 17, 2007.
68
Ferguson III, 808 N.W.2d at 589. The district court initially sentenced Ferguson on the assault counts but not the
drive-by shooting for a total sentence of 75 months in prison. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed his
convictions but reversed the sentences, holding that the court should sentence Ferguson in accordance with the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Franks, 765 N.W.2d 68 (Minn. 2009). Ferguson I, at *5. In
Franks, the Supreme Court held that when a defendant commits a series of crimes during a single behavioral
incident, the court must impose sentence only on the single most serious crime even where imposing consecutive
sentences on several less-serious crimes would result in a longer total sentence. Franks, 765 N.W.2d at 77-78.
Ferguson argued that under Franks, the district court should have sentenced him only for the drive-by shooting and
not for the assaults. On remand, the district court sentenced Ferguson for drive-by shooting and each count of
second-degree assault. The court of appeals reversed the sentences again, holding that the district court had violated
section 609.035 and Franks. Ferguson II, 786 N.W.2d at 644-45. The Minnesota Supreme Court then reversed the
court of appeals and affirmed the sentences. Ferguson III, 808 N.W.2d at 589.
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sentences consecutive to one another, was 75 months in prison.69 The Minnesota
Supreme Court ultimately held that multiple sentences were proper under the multiplevictim exception.70
The prosecution in Ferguson used the multiple-victim exception to do what
section 609.035 was designed to prevent: use convictions for multiple offenses
committed during a single behavioral incident to drive up the defendant’s sentence. The
prosecution used the exception to effectively charge-bargain with Ferguson and his
brothers. The Dillard brothers were able to avoid additional charges and additional
sentences by pleading guilty but Ferguson, who elected to maintain his plea of not guilty,
was not.71 If the Legislature intended to allow the late addition of multiple charges for
offenses committed during a single behavioral incident to drive the total sentence, no
such intent is evident in the plain language of section 609.035. To the contrary, the
language of that statute indicates that the Legislature intended the exact opposite.
2. The Exception Was Born of Dubious Statutory Interpretation and,
as a Result, is Subject to Change on a Case-by-Case Basis.
The bigger and more holistic problem with the exception is that it was born of
dubious statutory interpretation. Because the exception is untethered to any statutory
language, its terms and the details of its application to a given case is subject to change.
a. The Judicial Creation of an Exception to a Statutory Rule
Violated Principles of Statutory Construction.

69

Id. at 589.
Id. at 592.
71
In his appeals, Ferguson challenged his sentences on, among other grounds, the argument that they were imposed
to punish him for exercising his constitutional right to a trial. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the sentences
without addressing the argument, thus at least implicitly rejecting it.
70
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The judicial creation of an exception to a statutory command runs counter to
several well-established principles of statutory construction.
First, section 609.035 unambiguously did not, and still does not, contain a
multiple-victim exception to its otherwise bright-line rule. This lack of ambiguity should
have precluded the Court from inquiring into whether the legislature intended to allow
multiple sentences for crimes against multiple victims.72 Ambiguity in a statute’s
language is a threshold issue for any statutory interpretation.xv That is, a statute is only
subject to judicial interpretation when it is “susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation.”xvi As such, an unambiguous statute presents no occasion for statutory
construction or inquiry into legislative intent.xvii The Minnesota Supreme Court did not
follow this principle when it created the multiple-victim exception. The plain language
of section 609.035 did not then, and does not now, contain a multiple-victim exception.
Moreover, the statute’s exceptions have been anything but ambiguous since enactment.
In light of the statute’s unambiguous language, the Court should not have inquired into
legislative intent.
Second, by creating the multiple-victim exception, the Court essentially added
language to section 609.035 under the guise of interpreting it. This is normally
impermissible. When a statute’s language is clear, a court is bound by the language and
may not read into the statute a provision that the legislature omitted.xviii This is true
regardless of the intent or inadvertence of the omission.xix Minnesota courts have

72

See Stangvik, 161 N.W.2d 672 (holding that “the legislature did not intend” to prohibit imposition of multiple
sentences against separate victims).
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repeatedly held that decisions regarding statutes’ amendments are firmly within the
province of the legislature, not the judiciary.xx As such, the Court’s reading a multiplevictim exception into section 609.035 where none existed was an overreach of the
Court’s authority, which simultaneously undercut the legislature’s power.xxi
Third, the legislature’s failure to enact a multiple-victim exception to section
609.035, in light of the numerous other legislatively created exceptions, indicates a
legislative intent not to create such an exception at all. Where the legislature is aware of
its authority to create exceptions to a statute, and has exercised that authority, a court is
barred from creating further exceptions.xxii Such an action by the court violates the
canon of statutory construction “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” or “the expression
of one thing is the exclusion of another.”xxiii The expressio unius doctrine reflects the
inference that any legislative omissions in a statute are intentional, particularly when the
language of the statute supports such an inference.xxiv
State v. Williams, provides an example of the application of the expressio unius
doctrine.xxv In Williams, the Court considered whether the Sentencing Guidelines
permitted use of the Hernandez methodxxvi in calculating a defendant’s criminal history
score when he was sentenced under section 609.035’s felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm
exception to section 609.035.xxvii The court considered the fact that the Sentencing
Guidelines Commission had “carefully considered the applicability of the Hernandez
method to sentencing in several contexts” over the prior thirteen years, creating specific
prohibitions to its use.xxviii The Court “decline[d] to step in where the Commission has
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decided not to act,” and held that the expressio unius doctrine prohibited extending the
exception for Hernandizing to felon-in-possession cases.xxix
Like the Hernandez method, Section 609.035 applies broadly but with exceptions
which have been gradually and periodically carved out by the legislature.xxx In light of
the legislature’s exemption of certain offenses from the one-sentence rule, its failure to
exempt crimes involving multiple victims from the statute’s ambit implicates the
expressio unius doctrine.xxxi That is, the legislature’s silence on a multiple-victim
exception creates an inference that it desired no such exception.xxxii
Finally, the Court relied on its own policy opinion about the propriety of imposing
multiple sentences in a particular case to create the multiple-victim exception. In
Stangvik, the Court affirmed the imposition of multiple sentences because such
sentencing “does not offend our sense of justice.”xxxiii Ordinarily, courts do not interpret
statutes to conform to the Court’s policy positions;xxxiv rather, policy considerations
expressed in statute remain the province of the legislature.xxxv Even where the language
of the statute leads to an unintended result, it remains the prerogative of the legislature,
not the courts, to correct it.xxxvi Because it is for the legislature to determine policy
implications in enacting and amending statutes, the court’s relying on its “sense of
justice” to create the multiple-victim exception to section 609.035 was inappropriate.xxxvii
b. Because it is unmoored from the language of a statute, the
multiple-victim exception is subject to change on a case-bycase basis.
Because the multiple-victim exception is unmoored from the language of section
609.035, application of the exception can change on a case-to-case basis. In Ferguson,
20
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for example, the Minnesota Supreme Court changed the exception in two dramatic ways.
Before that case, courts applying the multiple-victim exception had affirmed the
imposition of no more than one sentence per victim per behavioral incident.73 The Court
had never before affirmed the imposition of more sentences than there were victims in a
particular behavioral incident.74 But in Ferguson, a case involving at most eight victims,
the Court affirmed the imposition of nine sentences.75 The Court did so by holding that
drive-by shooting of an occupied building was a victimless crime.76 This result was
unprecedented and was at least arguably contrary to previous Supreme Court decisions in
this area.77 This expansion of the multiple-victim exception runs afoul not only of the
plain language of section 609.035 but also goes beyond the point of the multiple-victim
exception, which is to account for each person victimized during a single behavioral
incident.
Ferguson also changed the exception in a second dramatic way. In Part II of its
opinion, the Court held that the district court could impose sentences for drive-by
shooting and for assault against the building’s occupants because the building’s

73

See, e.g., Schmidt, 612 N.W.2d at 878; Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d at 453.
This was true even where the intended victim of an offense was not so clear. In State v. Rieck, 286 N.W.2d 724
(Minn. 1979), for example, the defendant firebombed a house in an attempt to intimidate a person the defendant
thought was inside against being a witness against the defendant’s half-brother. Id. at 725. The intended target was
not inside the house, but five other people were. Id. The Supreme Court held that the district court properly
imposed separate sentences for one count of attempted witness tampering and five counts of assault. Id. at 726-27.
This was because each crime had a separate “victim” – the absent potential witness was the victim of the tampering
charge, and each occupant of the house was a victim of his or her own assault. Id.
75
Id. at 592.
76
See Ferguson III, 808 N.W.2d at 591 (holding that victims of assaults who were inside building were not also
victims of drive-by shooting at an occupied building); see also Id. at 594-96 (P. Anderson, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with majority for holding that drive-by shooting of an occupied building is a “victimless crime”).
77
See Ferguson III, 808 N.W.2d at 597 (P. Anderson, J., dissenting) (citing Skipintheday, 717 N.W.2d at 427)
(discussing case in which Court held that crimes without concrete victims did not qualify for sentencing under
multiple-victim exception). This was the topic of Ferguson’s petition for rehearing, which the Court denied.
74
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occupants were not victims of drive-by shooting.78 In Part III of the opinion, the Court
wrote that even if it was wrong, and that “drive-by shooting at an occupied building [was]
the most serious offense committed against each victim,” the district court still could
properly have imposed multiple sentences for drive-by shooting and assault.79 This was
true, the Court wrote, because the rationale behind section 609.035 – that punishment for
the most serious crime committed during a behavioral incident includes and adequately
accounts for punishment for all crimes committed during that incident – “does not hold
true” in this situation.80 The Court opined that sentencing Ferguson only for the most
serious offense committed during the behavioral incident “fails to reflect Ferguson’s
increased culpability for committing an act of violence with intent to harm more than one
person.”81 The Court then pronounced a new rule: when “a sentence on the most serious
offense unfairly depreciates the criminality of the defendant’s conduct…the rule [that a
defendant may only be sentenced on the most serious offense per victim] does not
apply.”82

78

Id. at 590-92.
Id.at 592. Part III of the Court’s opinion in Ferguson is arguably dicta, because the Court affirmed Ferguson’s
sentences in Part II of its opinion and therefore the discussion in Part III was not necessary to the holding of the
case. See Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 709 n.6 (1978) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (defining dictum as “language in a decision not necessary to the holding”); see also Black’s Law
Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009) (defining “obiter dictum” as “A judicial comment made while delivering a judicial
opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential (although it may be
considered persuasive).”). But the Minnesota Supreme Court has used a more narrow definition of dicta. See State
v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 395 n.7 (Minn. 2008) (defining dicta as “expressions in a court’s opinion which go
beyond the facts before the court and therefore are the individual views of the author of the opinion and not binding
in subsequent cases.”) (quoting State ex rel. Foster v. Naftalin, 74 N.W.2d 249, 266 (Minn. 1956)). Part III of
Ferguson III does not “go beyond the facts before the court,” Id., and therefore Part III is probably not dicta under
the standard articulated in Timberlake.
80
Ferguson III, 808 N.W.2d at 592.
81
Id.
82
Ferguson III, 808 N.W.2d at 592 n.4. The footnote actually referenced “the rule announced in Kebaso, 713
N.W.2d at 322.” The specific “rule announced in Kebaso” was that a sentencing court may not consider possible
immigration consequences of a particular crime when determining which of several crimes is the most serious.
79
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This new rule was unprecedented. It also generates a host of questions: when does
sentencing on the most serious offense “unfairly depreciate[] the criminality of the
defendant’s conduct”? By what standard should courts use to determine whether this is
the case? How much of depreciation must exist before the depreciation becomes unfair?
To whom must the final sentence by unfair: the victim or victims, or the prosecution, or
society in general? If sentencing a defendant for the most serious offense “unfairly
depreciates the criminality of the defendant’s conduct,” can the sentencing court choose a
different offense on which to sentence the defendant, or can the sentencing court ignore
section 609.035 altogether if the court determines that the rationale behind the statute
“does not hold true”? The Court did not address any of these questions or provide any
guidance to lower courts on how to apply this new standard.83 But taken to its logical
conclusion, the new rule of Ferguson III threatens to gut the protections of section
609.035, or at least reduce that previously mandatory statute to an optional one based
upon an exercise of judicial discretion.
3. The “unfairly exaggerates” standard is insufficient to ensure
rational and proportional sentences imposed under the multiplevictim exception.
Recall that when a court imposes multiple sentences for offenses committed
against several victims during the same behavioral incident, the total sentence imposed

Kebaso, 713 N.W.2d at 322 (“We granted review on the narrow issue of whether the court of appeals erred in
refusing to consider the potential immigration consequences to Kebaso when deciding which sentence to vacate.”).
It appears that the Court in Ferguson III was referring to Kebaso’s discussion of the then almost fifty-year-old rule
requiring sentencing on the most serious offense per victim per behavioral incident. See Minn. Stat. § 609.035
(1963 Committee Comment); Johnson, 141 N.W.2d 520-21.
83
The dissent did not address Part III of the majority opinion.
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cannot unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.84 This rule is
designed to ensure that sentences imposed under the exception are proportional to the
defendant’s conduct.85 But this rule is difficult to apply because the Minnesota Supreme
Court has never set forth a specific standard for determining whether a sentence is
proportional to or unfairly exaggerates the criminality of a defendant’s conduct.86 Not
surprisingly, this lack of clarity can lead to inconsistent results.
For example, in State v. Norris, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a
defendant’s sentence of life imprisonment plus a consecutive 300-month prison term,
which was the result of imposing six consecutive sentences for crimes committed against
multiple victims, unfairly exaggerated the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.87 In
reaching its conclusion, the Court focused not on the defendant’s conduct – shooting up a
bar full of patrons, killing one of them – but rather on the number of consecutive
sentences imposed.88 Other than noting that in other cases it had affirmed the imposition
of two or three consecutive sentences but never six, the Court provided no guidance on
why the sentences imposed in Norris were so unfair as to require reversal.89 But just six
years later, in State v. Cole, the Court affirmed the imposition of six consecutive

84

Marquart, 294 N.W.2d at 851.
See Edwards, 774 N.W.2d at 606 n.6.
86
Sometimes Minnesota’s appellate courts use their “collective, collegial experience in reviewing a large number of
criminal appeals” to determine whether the imposition of multiple sentences, or the total length of such a sentence,
is unreasonable. See State v. Rhoades, 690 N.W.2d 135, 140 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (citing, inter alia, State v.
Miller, 488 N.W.2d 235, 241 (Minn. 1992)). Often this review involves comparing the facts and sentence of the
case at bar to the facts of other, purportedly similar sentences. See, e.g., State v. Vickla, 793 N.W.2d 265, 270-71
(Minn. 2011).
87
Norris, 428 N.W.2d at 70-71.
88
Id.
89
Id.; see also Goulette, 442 N.W.2d at 794-95.
85
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sentences for murder, assault, and kidnapping.90 In Cole, the Court focused not on the
number of consecutive sentences but rather on the heinousness of the defendant’s
conduct.91 The Court did not cite or distinguish Norris but instead relied upon a case in
which it had affirmed the imposition of two consecutive sentences.92 Situations like this
reveal that district courts have little guidance on when the imposition of numerous
sentences under the multiple-victim exception will be deemed excessive.
In applying the “unfairly exaggerated” standard, courts often compare the facts
and sentences in the case at bar to the facts and sentences in other cases.93 But even this
standard proves difficult to apply because courts often struggle with identifying
appropriate comparable offenses, and individual Justice can view a particular sentence in
dramatically different ways. In State v. Poole, for example, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals reversed the imposition of six consecutive sentences, totaling 18 years, for
several counts of fourth-degree criminal-sexual-conduct offenses committed against
separate victims.94 The court acted because “[d]espite the egregious facts, [the court
found] it…troubling that Poole received a sentence (216 months) substantially greater
than the presumptive sentence for felony murder (150 months).”95 The Minnesota
Supreme Court affirmed the sentence reduction without much comment.96 But Justice
Tomjanovich dissented from the portion of the opinion affirming the sentence reduction.
In her mind, the original 18-year sentence did not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of
90

State v. Cole, 542 N.W.2d 43, 53 (Minn. 1996).
Id.
92
Id. (citing State v. Montalvo, 324 N.W.2d 650, 652 (Minn. 1982)).
93
See, e.g., Vickla, 793 N.W.2d at 270-71.
94
State v. Poole, 489 N.W.2d 537, 544 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
95
Id.
96
State v. Poole, 499 N.W.2d 31, 36 (Minn. 1993).
91
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the defendant’s conduct.97 Justice Tomjanovich would have held that the reduction of the
sentence “minimizes the criminality of his conduct,” and would have compared the total
sentence to not one but rather 16 felony murders.98 Because neither the majority nor the
dissent provided much rational for their respective opinions, decisions like Poole provide
little guidance for lower courts on whether a particular sentence, which appears otherwise
lawful, will be deemed unfair.
In the next section, this article encourages the Legislature to step back into this
arena and provide guidance to courts on how to sentence defendants who commit several
crimes during a single behavioral incident.
IV.

THE LEGISLATURE SHOULD AMEND SECTION 609.035 TO
CODIFY THE MULTIPLE-VICTIM EXCEPTION AND CLARIFY
THAT THE EXCEPTION SHOULD NOT SWALLOW THE RULE.
This article proposes that the Minnesota Legislature should amend section 609.035

to codify the multiple-victim exception. The Legislature should do so in a way that
ensures that the exception will not be used as a charge-bargaining weapon; that the
exception will not drive sentences to unreasonable lengths; and that the exception will not
swallow the rule against multiple sentences or the rationale behind it.
Before we begin, however, a quick word about legislative authority in this area is
in order. Under Minnesota’s constitutional separation-of-powers principles, “the power
to fix the limits of punishments for criminal acts lies with the legislature.”99 The
Legislature may use this power to limit the range of sentencing opinions available to a
97

Id. at 36 (Tomjanovich, J., dissenting)
Id. (emphasis original).
99
State v. Bluhm, 676 N.W.2d 649, 651 (Minn. 2004) (citation omitted).
98
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judge in a particular case. The Legislature has done so in many situations, including by
enacting mandatory sentencing guidelines, mandatory-minimum sentencing statutes, and
section 609.035 itself.100 Under these principles, the Legislature would act entirely
appropriately by amending section 609.035 to account for, and/or to limit, the multiplevictim exception. This is particularly true because although the Supreme Court has
contended that the multiple-victim exception stemmed from its opinion about the intent
of the Legislature.101 The Legislature is therefore free to express its actual intent by
amending the statute.102
The multiple-victim exception is worth preserving, at least partially. Imposing
one sentence per victim can, in some number of cases, produce perfectly just sentencing
results. However, for the reasons discussed supra., the legislature should also limit the
exception so that it does not swallow the rule or its rationale. In order to do so, the
Legislature could amend section 609.035 as follows:
Subd. 7. Exception; multiple victims. Notwithstanding subdivision 1, when a
case involves offenses committed against multiple victims during a single
behavioral incident, a court may, subject to the limitations expressed herein,
impose one conviction and sentence per offense per victim. When proceeding
under this subdivision, the court shall impose a sentence for the most serious crime
committed against each victim. The court shall determine which crime is most
serious by comparing the statutory-maximum sentences and the offense-severity
levels under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. If those provisions are equal
100

See State v. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d 131 (Minn. 2005) (holding that sentencing guidelines are mandatory); Bluhm,
676 N.W.2d at 651 (upholding mandatory-minimum sentencing provision). See also Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989) (holding that creation of federal sentencing guidelines did not violate federal separation-ofpowers principles).
101
State v. Bookwalter, 541 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Minn. 1995) (multiple-victim exception was based upon the Court’s
“interpretation of legislative intent as expressed in the wording of the statute”); Stangvik, 161 N.W.2d at 672
(contending that “the legislature did not intend” to disallow multiple punishments for crimes against multiple
victims).
102
This is particularly true because “the statutory text is the authoritative statement of legislative intent.” Gassler v.
State, 787 N.W.2d 575, 584 n.9 (Minn. 2010).
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or do not apply, the court may compare the nature of the offenses. A court
proceeding under this subdivision shall not impose more than two convictions and
sentences per behavioral incident.
This type of amendment would address several of the problems with the courtcreated exception. It would codify the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decades-old,
common-sense standard for determining which of several offenses is most serious.103
The standard is easy to apply and, because it is largely objective, should lead to
consistent and rational results by judges considering similar cases. This kind of clarity
will produce more consistent results. Also, given that the Legislature and the Sentencing
Guidelines Commission have spent decades making policy decisions regarding the
seriousness of offenses – as expressed in statutory maximum sentences and severity-level
rankings – there is no reason to not follow their respective leads.
By providing that the court “shall” impose sentence only on the most serious
offense committed against a particular victim, the amendment should prevent Part III of
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s opinion in Ferguson III from gutting section 609.035.104
Recall that Ferguson III, the Court held the district court did not need to impose sentence
on the most serious offense per victim if the court determined that doing so would
“unfairly depreciate[] the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.”105 The proposed

103

Kebaso, 713 N.W.2d at 322 (citing cases dating to 1980 as providing guidance on determining which of several
offenses is most serious).
104
The amendment would negate Part III of Ferguson III because it provides that the court “shall impose a sentence
for the most serious crime” committed against each victim, and goes to describe how a court is to decide which
crime is most serious. The word “shall” imposes a mandatory duty. See Bluhm, 676 N.W.2d at 652 (holding that
sentencing statute providing that the court “shall” impose a jail term imposed a mandatory requirement) (citing State
v. Humes, 581 N.W.2d 317, 319 (Minn. 1998) (holding that a sentencing statute providing that the court “shall”
impose a conditional-release term as part of a sentence created a mandatory requirement)). Under the proposed
amendment, the court would not be free to disregard the “most serious crime” rule, as it is under Ferguson III.
105
Ferguson III, 808 N.W.2d at 592 n.4.
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amendment replaces that vague standard with a clear, easy-to-apply statutory rule; a rule
which will ensure that the defendant is sentenced for the most serious crime he or she
commits against a particular victim. The “most serious crime” rule has served Minnesota
well since 1963, and the Legislature should make sure that the rule continues to do so.
The proposed amendment would replace the “unfairly exaggerates” standard with
a more objective limit on sentencing: the statute should cap at two the total number of
sentences a district court may impose under the multiple-victim exception. This type of
“hard cap,” or objective limit on the number and thus the length of sentences to be
imposed, is much easier to apply than the current “soft cap,” which asks whether the total
sentence unfairly exaggerates the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.106 Replacing
the “unfairly exaggerates” standard with a two-sentence rule solves the problem of
inconsistent results caused by the current soft cap, described above. An objective twosentence rule is clearer and much easier to apply than the subjective “unfairly
exaggerates” rule. Because the proposed standard is objective, it will lead to less diverse
sentencing results, one of the goals of Minnesota’s sentencing system.107 A two-sentence
rule will also eliminate an incentive for the kind of charge-bargaining which occurred in
Ferguson, because the prosecution will not have an incentive to load up the complaint
with duplicative charges, which could result in multiple and longer sentences.
Furthermore, the “unfairly exaggerates” portion of the multiple-victim exception is
unnecessary. In every case, an appellate court may review a sentence to determine if it is
106

See Skipintheday, 717 N.W.2d at 426.
See Minn. Sent. Guidelines § 1 (2012) (goal of the sentencing guidelines is essentially to ensure that defendants
with similar criminal histories who commit similar crimes receive similar sentences).
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“inconsistent with statutory requirements, unreasonable, inappropriate, excessive,
unjustifiably disparate, or not warranted by the findings of fact issued by the district
court.”108 Appellate courts will be able to use this authority to reduce an unreasonably
long sentence even if the “unfairly exaggerates” standard is replaced by a two-sentence
rule.109
A two-sentence rule for the multiple-victim exception would be consistent with
the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines’ provisions on determining how many criminalhistory points to assign a defendant who was sentenced under the multiple-victim
exception. The Guidelines provide that, when calculating a criminal-history score,
“[w]hen multiple current convictions arise out of a single course of conduct in which
there were multiple victims, weights are given only to the two offenses at the highest
severity levels.”110 The purpose of this provision is “[t]o limit the impact of past
variability in prosecutorial [charging] discretion,”111 which is also the purpose of the
proposed two-sentence amendment to section 609.035. While the Sentencing Guidelines
Commission purported to be concerned about “past variability in prosecutorial
discretion,”112 there is no evidence that such variability is only a thing of the past.
The Guidelines rule is similar to the proposed amendment because both are
concerned with multiple sentences imposed during a “single course of conduct” or
“single behavioral incident.” The Guidelines provision applies “to a situation in which a
108

Minn. Stat. § 244.11, subd. 2(b) (2010).
See Neal v. State, 658 N.W.2d 536, 547-48 (Minn. 2003) (acting under authority of section 244.11, subd. 2, to
reduce 480-month sentence for kidnapping because sentence was “not commensurate with the gravity of the
crime.”).
110
Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.1.d.(2) (2012).
111
Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.110 (2012) (Comment).
112
Id. (emphasis added).
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crime or crimes are committed against multiple victims during the course of an incident
which is limited in time and place,” a standard similar to the test for when multiple
crimes were committed during a single behavioral incident for purposes of section
609.035.113 Given the similarities between the two concepts, it is not surprising that
appellate courts have looked to cases interpreting the “single behavioral incident”
requirement of section 609.035 for guidance on what constitutes a “single course of
conduct” under the Guidelines.114 The Sentencing Guidelines-based two-sentence rule
has not generated any major controversial decisions or, indeed, much caselaw at all. The
lack of controversy surrounding the Sentencing Guidelines version of the two-sentence
rule shows that such a rule can be applied in a fair, evenhanded way, and can lead to fair
results.
A two-sentence rule might be subject to a couple of criticisms. First, a limit of
two sentences might be deemed arbitrary. This same criticism, however, would hold
against any numerical limit on sentencing. Almost any numeric limit on anything can be
dismissed as “arbitrary.” Why, for example, must certain second-time controlledsubstance-crime offenders serve six months in jail? 115 Why not a three-month term, a
one-month term, or a nine-month term? In addition, by equating the number of sentences
which could be imposed with the already-existing two-sentence rule of the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines, the proposed amendment would not be arbitrary. Instead, the
113

State v. Parr, 414 N.W.2d 776, 780 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (emphasis original); see also Bookwalter, 541 N.W.2d
at 293-96 (explaining single-behavioral-incident standard).
114
See State v. Watkins, 2012 WL 3155948, *4 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012) (citing State v. Banks, 331 N.W.2d 491, 494
(Minn. 1983)), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 24, 2012) (relying upon a Minnesota Supreme Court case interpreting the
“single behavioral incident” rule to decide whether defendant’s prior crimes occurred during a “single course of
conduct” under Sentencing Guidelines). The author of this article represented the appellant in Watkins.
115
See Bluhm, 676 N.W.2d at 651-52 (affirming mandatory six-month jail sentence).
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goal of the amendment would be to make sentencing under the multiple-victim exception
consistent with well-established sentencing law in a similar area. Furthermore, following
the lead of the Guidelines Commission is particularly appropriate because “on most
issues, the [Commission] retains primary control over sentencing policy formulation.” 116
A second, more valid criticism might be that under the two-sentence rule a
defendant would not receive a separate punishment for offending against a particular
victim. One of the purposes of the multiple-victim exception is to account, in the
punishment for a crime or crimes, for each victim.117 But even under a two-sentence rule,
the total sentence imposed can account for all of the victims of a crime. A court may
impose a sentence of aggravated duration upon a defendant whose criminal conduct puts
several people at risk of harm, even where the defendant is convicted and sentenced for
several of the offenses.118 Thus, under the two-sentence rule a defendant who is
convicted of multiple offenses against multiple victims might only be able to be
sentenced for two of those crimes, but at least one of those sentences might be
enhanceable because of the existence of other victims or possible victims.119
Finally, the Legislature would legitimize and endorse the multiple-victim
exception by codifying it. Codification of the multiple-victim exception would neutralize
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Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota 1978-2003, 32 Crime & Just. 131, 204 (2005).
See Stangvik, 161 N.W.2d at 673.
118
See Edwards, 774 N.W.2d at 606-07 (holding that where defendant is convicted of several offenses against
multiple victims during a single behavioral incident, the court may impose multiple sentences and an upward
durational departure if facts show the defendant committed the crime in a particularly serious way); State v. Mitjans,
408 N.W.2d 824, 834 (Minn. 1987) (upward-departure sentence affirmed where defendant fired two shots into a bar,
killing one person and “put[ting] a number of people at risk and in fear”).
119
Edwards, 774 N.W.2d at 606-07 & 609 n.10; see also Minn. Stat. § 244.10, subd. 5a(b) (2012) (providing that,
notwithstanding section 609.035, a court may impose an aggravated sentence based upon any factor which occurs
during the same course of conduct as the to-be-sentenced offense).
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criticism, such as that in this article, that the exception itself is invalid. More
importantly, codification would finally moor the exception to a statute. This anchoring
should prevent the kind of case-by-case shift in application epitomized by Ferguson. It
would make the exception more readily apparent to practitioners and judges and would
standardize its application.
When it enacted section 609.035 fifty years ago, the legislature evinced an intent
to not allow criminal sentencing to veer out of control, or to be subject to the whims of
individual judges, or to change dramatically based upon the facts of a particular case. Put
simply, the legislature evinced intent to limit judicial discretion in this area. Codification,
and limitation, of the multiple-victim exception to the protections of section 609.035
would legitimately re-establish legislative authority in this area; would protect criminal
defendants from the kind of charge-bargaining that section 609.035 was designed to
prevent; and would serve Minnesota’s laudable goal of maintaining a rational and
predictable sentencing system.
V.

CONCLUSION.
Sentencing in Minnesota is motived by two equally important concerns: that

defendants should receive a sentence commensurate with their criminal conduct, and that
similar defendants who commit similar crimes should receive similar sentences. Section
609.035 serves both of these goals. The court-created multiple-victim exception to the
one-sentence rule of section 609.035 does not. Accordingly, the Minnesota Legislature
should amend section 609.035 and create a multiple-victim exception which is simple,
easy to apply, will lead to sentences proportionate with criminal conduct, and will ensure
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that similarly situated criminal defendants are treated similarly. By acting in this manner,
the Legislature will ensure that Minnesota’s sentencing system will continue to produce
just results in future cases.
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